Morocco’s Investment Charter does not run one support scheme. It runs two, separated at MAD 50 million of total project cost, designed at different times and never reconciled with each other.
For most projects the threshold is academic: a hotel at MAD 300 million or a workshop at MAD 6 million has no choice to make. For projects sitting anywhere near the line, it is one of the more consequential structuring decisions available, and it is usually made by accident.
This piece assumes the project already clears the job-creation gate that governs entry to either scheme. Where it does not (and for capital-intensive projects it frequently does not), the question of which scheme applies never arises. We cover that, and why the advertised 30% is rarely what an investor receives, in Morocco’s Investment Charter: why the 30% headline rarely applies.
What sits on each side
The main support scheme applies to projects of at least MAD 50 million creating at least 50 stable jobs, or, regardless of amount, to projects creating at least 150 stable jobs. It carries seven premiums: job-creation ratio, gender balance in payroll, future skills and sector upgrading, environmental performance, local integration, a territorial premium and a sector premium.
The SME scheme, established by decree 2.25.342, covers projects between MAD 1 million and MAD 50 million, requiring at least 10% own funds, a business line listed as eligible for the region concerned, and a stable-job ratio of at least 1.5 per million dirhams invested, reduced to 1 for tourism. It carries three premiums: job-creation ratio, territorial, and priority activity.
Both are capped at 30% of the eligible amount. That is where the symmetry ends.
Identical performance, different value
The job-creation scales do not use the same brackets, and they do not pay the same:
| Stable jobs per MAD million | Main scheme | SME scheme |
|---|---|---|
| >1 and <1.5 | 5% | not eligible |
| 1.5 to <2 | 7% | eligible, no job premium |
| 2 to 3 | 7% | 5% |
| >3 and ≤5 | 10% | 5% |
| >5 and ≤10 | 10% | 7% |
| >10 | 10% | 10% |
Because the ratio is measured per million invested, the same hiring plan lands in different brackets depending on how the project is sized, and the brackets do not reward the same performance equally.
Note the second row. Between 1.5 and 2 jobs per million, an SME project is eligible for the scheme but earns nothing on the job line: it has cleared the gate and missed the premium. The same ratio above the line pays 7%.
The counter-intuitive part
Take an industrial project with a hiring plan of 192 stable jobs.
At MAD 48 million, that is a ratio of 4.0. SME scheme: 5%, MAD 2.4 million, a net cost of 45.6 million.
At MAD 52 million, the same 192 jobs give a ratio of 3.7. Main scheme: 10%, MAD 5.2 million, a net cost of 46.8 million.
Same hiring plan, same province, same activity. Four million dirhams of additional CAPEX cost the investor 1.2 million net: the State absorbs roughly 70% of the increment. And the lower ratio is worth more, because it is measured against a scale that starts lower.
And the job line is not what decides the question. Crossing MAD 50 million does not buy five points on one premium. It opens four premiums that do not exist below: gender, future skills, environmental performance and local integration.
The SME scheme has one real counter-argument: its priority-activity premium pays 10%, against 5% for the equivalent sector premium above the line. On that item, the smaller scheme pays twice as well.
Both schemes, same project
An industrial project in a category A province, with the same 192-job hiring plan:
| MAD 48m (SME) | MAD 52m (main) | |
|---|---|---|
| Jobs | 5% | 10% |
| Territorial | 10% | 10% |
| Priority activity / sector | 10% | 5% |
| Gender, future skills, environment, local integration | – | up to 12% |
| Total | 25% | 37%, capped at 30% |
| Premium | MAD 12m | MAD 15.6m |
| Net cost | MAD 36m | MAD 36.4m |
Four million dirhams of additional asset for four hundred thousand net.
Two things are worth noticing in that table. The main scheme’s calculated total exceeds the cap, so part of the premium stack is wasted: a project already above 30% gains nothing from an additional 3% line. And the comparison depends heavily on whether the activity appears on the SME priority list, which is not the same list as the main scheme’s sector list.
A usable decision rule
Cross the threshold where the additional CAPEX buys something productive: capacity, equipment, a second line, a longer-lived asset. The increment is subsidised at 70 to 90%, and it is close to free.
Stay below it where crossing would mean inflating the budget. The investor pays real money to carry unproductive assets for the life of the project, and takes on the matching job commitments in the agreement.
Check the SME priority-activity list before running any numbers. If the activity is on it, the 10% priority premium narrows the gap sharply and staying below the line becomes defensible. If it is not, the main scheme wins comfortably.
Check whether the stack already exceeds 30% before optimising it. Above the cap, additional premiums are decorative.
One condition rarely enters this calculation. The main scheme does not only apply a ratio: it requires at least 50 stable jobs in absolute terms. The SME scheme applies no floor at all, only the ratio. A project with a modest headcount can therefore be supported below the line and barred from the scheme above it, whatever its ratio. And whichever scheme applies, the hiring plan written into the investment agreement is binding and conditions disbursement. The right scheme is the one whose commitments the project can actually meet.
